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Abstract
We study theoretically and in a lab-experiment investment decisions in environ-
ments where property rights are absent. In our setting a player chooses an investment
level before interacting repeatedly with a given set of agents. The investment stochas-
tically affects the payoffs of the game in every subsequent period. We show that
investments with less volatile returns are more likely to be observed since they facili-
tate cooperation. We also show that the investor might be forced to invest more than
he would in an environment with legal protection, to keep other players cooperative.
Experimental results are broadly consistent with the theoretical findings.
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1 Introduction
An entrepreneur considers investing in a foreign country where there is a risk of expropriation.
A user of a public good needs to invest to improve its quality in a setting where overuse of
the public good is a serious concern. A firm must decide how much to invest in innovation
in an environment where intellectual property rights are weak. In these types of situations
with weak property rights, how do the characteristics of the environment affect investment?
It is well understood that repeated interactions can serve as a substitute for legal enforce-
ment. In this paper, we examine how informal enforcement, through repeated interactions,
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affects the initial investment decision. First, we find that, the characteristics of the environ-
ment affect investment differently when legal protection is present than when it is absent.
In particular, controlling for mean returns, investment is more likely when returns are less
volatile, even if agents are risk-neutral. Second, we show that the absence of protection may
sometimes foster greater investment and we characterize conditions, based on the shape of
returns or characteristics of the game, that lead to these high levels of investment.
We conduct a laboratory experiment and, to some extent, the theoretical framework is
built to structure and guide the interpretation of the experiment. Our experiment is designed
to understand investment decisions in environments where property rights are absent and
this can become a promising avenue of research for providing evidence on an issue extremely
difficult to test with field data.1 The experimental results are broadly consistent with our
theoretical findings. Furthermore, the experiment contributes to the growing literature on
infinitely repeated games in the lab. Finally, it also has value in shedding light on equilibrium
selection in a setting characterized by multiple equilibria.
The basic structure of our theoretical model is as follows. An agent, Player 1, makes an
initial investment which determines the i.i.d. stochastic distribution of payoffs in subsequent
periods. In the absence of property rights, there are N other players who can grab a share
of the payoffs in any period. We model the interaction of the N + 1 players as an infinitely
repeated prisoner’s dilemma. We know theoretically that repeated interactions can serve as
a substitute for outside enforcement. If players are arbitrarily patient, it is easy to sustain
investment even without legal protection.
With players who are only moderately patient, investment is more difficult. We show
that the shape of the distribution of returns, in particular its volatility, determines what
investments can be observed in equilibrium. Specifically, if an investment level k is part of
an equilibrium for a distribution of returns F , it will also be for a different distribution that
second order stochastically dominates F .
The intuition is the following. In the absence of legal protection, investment may require
that players be able to cooperate, so that Player 1 can recoup his initial outlay. This “coop-
eration condition” is more easily satisfied when returns from investment are less volatile. To
see this, consider two distributions with identical mean but where the first is more volatile
and payoffs can take larger values. In a period where a large payoff is obtained, the temp-
tation to deviate and grab a greater share of the payoff is acute, while the promise of the
future remains fixed. It thus becomes less likely that the players are able to cooperate along
1A similar argument in favour of experiments in economics is given in Falk and Heckman (2009), where
the authors focus in particular on the application to employment relations. Meloso at al. (2009) also conduct
an experiment capturing innovative behavior where they compare different reward mechanisms.
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paths that sometimes have very large period payoffs. This observation implies that, holding
expected returns fixed, we should see relatively more low variance investments when legal
protections are weak.
We then compare the results to a benchmark model with legal protections that ensure
that the agent captures the rents from his investment. We show that there are circumstances
under which an agent will invest more if the investment is not legally protected. The reason is
that higher initial investments shift up the distribution of future returns, thereby facilitating
cooperation as the future returns to cooperation increase.2
The experimental framework echoes the theoretical setup. Participants are randomly
matched in pairs and one member of each pair initially has to make an investment, among
five choices. This initial investment determines, in each period of the indefinitely repeated
game that follows, the probability of getting a prize of fixed value. In treatments without
protection, the two participants play a prisoner’s dilemma. We run two types of treatments
where we vary the investment options, keeping the expected return fixed. For a given in-
vestment, in one treatment there is a high probability of having a low positive return and in
the second a low probability of obtaining a high positive return (with the same mean). The
payoffs are such that any investment level is an equilibrium in the first type of treatment,
while an intermediate level of investment is not an equilibrium in the second, where returns
are more volatile.
We find, in coherence with the logic sketched above, that cooperation is observed less
often in the second treatment following an out of equilibrium behavior. Furthermore, in the
second treatment, both the zero investment outcome and strictly higher levels of investments
become more likely, suggesting that participants are indeed more likely not to invest the level
which is no longer an equilibrium. Moreover, some participants revert to the degenerate
equilibrium – no investment/ no cooperation – while others choose to invest more to foster
cooperation. We also run treatments with legal protection where the investor obtains the full
prize following the investment. We find that the average level of investment in treatments
with and without protection are comparable.
Our study contributes to the recent experimental literature on cooperation and collusion
in infinitely repeated games (Dal Bo 2005; Dreber et al. 2008; Camera and Casari 2009;
Aoyagi and Frechette 2009; Dal Bo and Frechette 2011; Bigoni, Potters and Spagnolo 2012).
As in several of these papers, our findings highlight the fact that players are sensitive to the
future expected profits when taking their current decisions.3 However, while this literature
2Note that we make no claim that these higher levels of investment are welfare increasing. Among other
things, in the presence of high fixed costs welfare comparisons depend upon how much of the surplus firms
manage to capture.
3Indeed we will find that cooperation is higher when the investor invested more initially.
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has mainly focused on understanding both the dynamics of cooperation and the conditions
favouring collusion or cooperation in infinitely repeated games, our focus is on the comparison
of investment choices under different institutional regimes. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to examine experimentally this type of game where a date zero decision
influences the type of game played repeatedly afterwards. Furthermore, this paper is also
one of the few that offers an experimental comparison of environments with and without
protection.
The idea that repeated interactions can serve as a substitute for legal enforcement is al-
ready well developed. Greif (1989, 1993) provides historical evidence. It is also the starting
point of the relational contracting literature (Klein and Leﬄer 1981, Levin 2003) that looks
more in detail at the contractual terms when interactions are repeated and contracts incom-
plete. However, in these papers, investment is absent. One exception is Halac (2013), who
examines a similar setup to ours, with an investment decision before a repeated game. She
also finds that investment might be higher than in a fully contractible benchmark. Whereas
our player invests more in order to facilitate cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma, in Ha-
lac the player invests more in order to increase her payoff from a bargaining game. The
focus of Halac’s paper is quite different than ours and this is reflected in the setup of her
model. Halac is interested in studying the contractual terms, not the conditions that favor
investment in the absence of protection nor comparing investment levels across protection
regimes. In particular, the returns in her model (provided agents trade) are identical across
periods and she therefore cannot obtain results in the spirit of our second order stochastic
dominance argument. In addition, since an important contribution of our paper is the exper-
imental evidence, our theoretical model is partly targeted towards formulating lab-testable
implications.
Ramey and Watson (1997) also examine a setting where a prior investment affects the
shape of a prisoner’s dilemma (in their setting, the investment affects only the payoff when
both cooperate). They share the idea that higher up-front investment favors cooperation.
They do not, however, focus on the comparison of investment levels between regimes nor do
they study the types of investment we can expect across regimes. They focus more specifically
on how this initial decision endogenously affects job destructions over the business cycle. In
a very different setup, Levine and Modica (2013) also examine a prior investment stage
before a repeated interaction. The game is a public goods game and they focus on how peer
discipline can encourage initial investment.
Our paper is also related to the literature on collusion in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986),
who study collusion in a stochastic environment over the business cycle. We add investments
in this framework. One interpretation of our model is that it endogenizes the shape of
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the business cycle. We also model the stochastic return differently, which allows us to
characterize the condition on second order stochastic dominance. In a similar vein, Dal Bo
(2007) studies collusion when the interest rate fluctuates.
Our theoretical and experimental results can speak to the renewed debate on the use
of patents to encourage investments in innovation (Boldrin and Levine 2008, Bessen and
Hunt 2007).4 Our results show that legal protection is not necessary for positive levels of
investment, and that the absence of patents may even lead to more innovation. There is
some empirical evidence consistent with this idea. We describe in the conclusion the case of
Red Hat, a very successful company selling an open source operating system and investing
heavily in research. As acknowledged in Red Hat’s annual report: “anyone can copy, modify
and redistribute Red Hat Enterprise Linux”. Numerous clones do indeed exist, but they
appear to avoid competing aggressively and do not gain much market share. We argue this
behavior is coherent with our theory and that Red Hat could potentially be more innovative
than if it had full property rights on its innovations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model.
In Section 3, we characterize the equilibria and derive our main theoretical results. In Section
4, we present the experimental setup and results. All proofs, tables and figures are presented
in the appendix.
2 Model
In this section, we present a formal model that is general enough to encompass many scenarios
of interest. In the next section, we supply several applications.
In period 0, Player 1 makes an initial investment k. The size of this initial investment
stochastically affects the payoffs in subsequent period. Specifically, given a period 0 in-
vestment k, F (pi, k) is the i.i.d. cumulative probability distribution of the payoff relevant
variable pi ≥ 0 in each subsequent period. We assume that F (0, 0) = 1, so that investment
is necessary for a positive return, and, for k′ > k, F (pi, k′) (weakly) first order stochastically
dominates F (pi, k).
In the game with legal protection, that we use as a benchmark, in period t ≥ 1 player
1 mechanically collects the payoff realization pit while the other players earn 0. Player 1
4Boldrin and Levine (2008) and Bessen and Hunt (2007) suggest that the software industry was more
innovative before the introduction of patents. Our theory suggest one channel. There are a number of papers
explaining how innovation may occur in the absence of any kind of formal protection (Scherer and Ross 1990,
Benoˆıt 1985, Henry and Ponce 2011, Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda 2012, Boldrin and Levine 2002 and 2005, see
also Anton and Yao 1994 and 2002). These papers show, in different environments, that innovation can
occur in the absence of formal protection. However, in all these contributions, less innovation is conducted
than if the innovator was granted a monopoly.
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chooses an investment level that maximizes his total expected discounted profits. That is,
Player 1 chooses k (in period 0) to maximize −k+∑∞t=1 δt ∫∞0 pidF (pi, k) = −k+ δ1−δE (pi|k),
where E (pi|k) = ∫∞
0
pidF (pi, k) <∞. We suppose the maximization problem has a solution
k∗ > 0.
Without legal protection, following Player 1’s initial investment the N +1 players engage
in an infinite horizon game, as follows. In each period t ≥ 1, the players play a prisoner’s
dilemma whose “scale” depends on the realization pit. As we will see, it is more difficult
for firms to cooperate in a period where the payoff realization is large. Hence, it may be in
Player 1’s interest to restrict the size of the payoff and we give him the option of doing so
by choosing, at no cost, a maximum value pi that the variable pi can take. We allow that pi
can be chosen to be ∞, so that no constraint is imposed.
More precisely, the players engage in the following game:
• In period t = 0, Player 1 chooses k ≥ 0 and p¯i ∈ (R+,∞).
• In each period t ≥ 1,
1. A draw pit of the payoff relevant variable is taken from F (pi, k).
2. Every player chooses between two actions C (“cooperate”) and D (“deviate”) as
a function of (ht, pit), where ht denotes the history of play up to date t.
• With two players, i.e., N + 1 = 2, payoffs are described by the following matrix, where
pˆit = min (pit, pi):
C D
C (α1pˆit, αopˆit) (γ1pˆit, βopˆit)
D (β1pˆit, γopˆit) (λ1pˆit, λopˆit)
We assume βi > αi, λi ≥ γi, λi < αi, and 1 > βi. These conditions mean that the
game played in each period is a prisoner’s dilemma, albeit one with, potentially, weakly
dominant strategies rather than strictly dominant ones. This potential difference is not
important and is only relevant for the experiment we run. The condition β1 < 1 ensures
that Player 1 always does worse in the absence of legal protections.
• The game with N + 1 players generalizes the matrix. If everyone plays C, the payoff of
player 1 is given by α1pˆit and the payoff of players {2, ..., N+1} is given by αopˆit. If player
1 plays D and all the others play C, player 1 obtains β1pˆit and players {2, ..., N + 1}
obtain γopˆit. If a single player other than 1 deviates, player 1 gets γ1pˆit, the deviator gets
βopˆit and all the others get γopˆit. Finally, if at least two players play D, player 1 obtains
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λ1pˆit and the other players obtain λopˆit.
5 Again, 1 > βi > αi > λi ≥ γi. Throughout,
we consider games where the payoff of players {2, ..., N + 1} are symmetric, though
our results can be extended to allow for asymmetries.
The dynamic game will typically have many equilibria. For ease of exposition, we restrict
ourselves to symmetric subgame perfect equilibria. In such equilibria, along the equilibrium
path of play, either every player chooses C or every player chooses D. Our analysis can be
extended to allow for asymmetric equilibria. In Section 3.2, we discuss an example in which
we consider all equilibria, without affecting the results. We note also that the restriction
to symmetric strategies is less severe than it may at first appear as the stage game itself
may be asymmetric. Thus, when the players cooperate this could be with a split that
purposely favours Player 1 – that is, α1 > α0 – in order to compensate Player 1 for his initial
investment.6
For player i, αi−λi provides a measure of the gains from cooperating, while βi−αi mea-
sures the instantaneous benefits from deviating. It turns out that an essential characteristic
of the game is the following parameter, which we call the “cooperation ratio” of the game:
R ≡ mini
[
αi − λi
βi − αi
]
The cooperation ratio will be shown to be useful in structuring comparisons between in-
vestment levels with and without protection. Below, we study some applications of the
model.
2.1 Application 1: investing in countries with weak property rights
Institutions play a key role in the amount of foreign direct investment flowing into coun-
tries (Benassy-Quere et al 2007; Wheeler and Mody 1992; Daude and Stein 2007). The
enforcement of legal rules also impacts the type of sectors attracting investments, although
evidence is a bit scarce. Our model can capture the decision of a firm investing in a country
where it faces a risk of expropriation. The size of the initial investment affects the stochastic
5These payoffs are chosen to keep the notation to a minimum. In most applications of the model, it
makes more sense for a player’s payoff from choosing D to strictly decrease as the number of other players
choosing D increases. We could make that assumption instead without changing our results.
6In a more general model, the shares of the players could be made endogenous. We have analyzed such
a model for the special application of innovation. There, the players play a pricing game in which they
may generate an uneven split by choosing different capacities. (Giving Player 1 a greater share eases his
investment constraint but makes cooperation more difficult in the subgame.) With appropriate modifications,
the results of this paper go through.
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production that the investment can generate. In each period that follows, the government
decides whether or not to expropriate the firm.
Specifically, we think of expropriation as imposing a very high tax rate. The firm decides
whether to evade taxes and the government simultaneously decides on the tax rate. In the
case of a reliable legal system, the tax authority cannot arbitrarily impose an exorbitant high
tax rate and the firm cannot evade. In the absence of a reliable legal system, the two players
play a prisoner’s dilemma. For the firm, C corresponds to not evading and paying the full
amount of taxes while D corresponds to evading a fixed portion 1− e of the production at a
cost c(1− e)pi (cost of dissimulating some income). For the tax authority C corresponds to
picking a low tax rate τ and D a high one τ (i.e., expropriate the firm). The game is then
the following:7
C D
C ((1− τ)pi , τpi) ((1− τ)pi , τpi)
D ((1− τ)epi + (1− c)(1− e)pi , τepi) ((1− τ)epi + (1− c)(1− e)pi , τepi)
We return to this example at the end of section 3.2 when interpreting the results.
2.2 Free-rider problem with weak property rights
In her Nobel lecture (2010), Ostrom describes her work on the different institutional ar-
rangements governing common pool resources. Referring to large scale studies of irrigation,
she notes that “farmer-managed systems are likely to grow more rice, distribute water more
equitably and keep their systems in better repair than government systems.” In the case of
forests, she describes activities undertaken by some members of the community to preserve
the quality of the public good.
Our model can be used to describe the interaction between users of a public good (such
as the wood from a forest in Ostrom’s example). In period 0, Player 1 has the capacity to
make an initial investment that will increase the quality of the public good. In each period
t, a draw of pit is taken, where pit is total size of the public good. The stochastic aspect in
the case of the forest is due, say, to fluctuating weather conditions.
With legal property rights, Player 1 controls access to the good. Without property rights,
following a realization pit the players decide on their levels of consumption of the public good.
Action C corresponds to consuming a low amount and D a high amount. Consumption at
the low level provides a personal benefit, while exerting minimal externalities on the other
7To satisfy the constraints imposed on the coefficients, we need the following conditions (1 − τ)pi <
(1 − τ)epi + (1 − c)(1 − e)pi, τpi < τpi, (1 − τ)pi > (1 − τ)epi + (1 − c)(1 − e)pi and τpi > τepi. Sufficient
conditions are τ > c and τe− τ + c(1− e) > 0.
8
parties. Consumption at a high level imposes significant costs, so that all players consuming
at a high level is unsustainable for that period. As written, this model does not take into
account the dynamics of overuse of the public good in the sense that there is no linkage
between the consumption today and the level of pi tomorrow. The externality is captured
here only within the period, but the model could be generalized to capture the dynamic
externality.
2.3 Application 3: investment in innovation
A growing share of innovation is conducted without the protection of patents. Consider
the case of the firm Red Hat, which we discuss in more detail in the conclusion. Most
of its revenues come from the sale of a pre-compiled version of the open source operating
system Linux, called Red Hat Enterprise Linux. Anyone can copy and resell this software
and numerous clones do indeed exist. However, these clones tend not to be very aggressive.
Furthermore, even in this environment with no protection, Red Hat invests a lot in innova-
tion: it is the biggest contributor to the Linux Kernel and pays the salaries of most of its
researchers.
The model can be used to represent the interaction between an innovator and a set of
imitators, such as Red Hat and its clones. With this interpretation, the initial investment
k is an investment in innovative capability, such as a research facility. This investment
determines the probability distribution of future innovations.8 In each period, the firm
randomly develops an innovation which can instantly be brought to market. The market
value of an innovation degrades over time; for simplicity, the life span of a new product is
exactly one period. The realization pit ≥ 0 is then monopoly profits in period t. In each
period, the firms play a prisoner’s dilemma in which defecting corresponds to charging a low
price, while cooperating corresponds to charging the monopoly price, with one caveat: if the
payoff realization is exceptionally high, the firms may choose to cooperate on a lower price
yielding p¯i instead of pi. This possibility is modeled by firm 1’s choosing p¯i in period 0.
With this interpretation, an innovator with a patent simply captures monopoly profits.
Without a patent, suppose that marginal cost is constant and, say, the firms split the market
symmetrically when they cooperate. We then have αi =
1
N+1
, 1
N+1
< βi < 1, γi = 0,and
0 ≤ λi < 1N+1 .9 By setting λi = 0, we can think of (D,D) as a reduced form way of modeling
8In a more general model, this stock investment would be complemented by on-going research expendi-
tures. We considered such a model in an earlier version, but this complication does not change our main
results.
9Thus, if N = 4, when two firms play D each one earns ζ5 , which is the same payoff they would earn if
all the firms played D. As indicated in footnote 4, this is for notational ease. We could instead have that
when m firms play D each one earns ζm without affecting our results.
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a price war down to marginal cost.
3 Investing to cooperate
3.1 Equilibria
In the absence of legal protection, there always exists a degenerate equilibrium in which
everyone plays D in periods t = 1, 2..., regardless of the value of pi, and Player 1 invests,
accordingly, kd = arg maxk
{−k + δ
1−δλ1
∫∞
0
pidF (pi, k)
}
. If returns are small when players
do not cooperate (i.e., λ1 small), then kd will be small and may well be zero. This is the
outcome most people have in mind when thinking of environments without legal rules.
There can also exist non-degenerate equilibria where Player 1 invests a significant amount.
Indeed, it is already well understood that repeated interactions can serve as a substitute for
legal enforcement. For any investment k, if players are arbitrarily patient they will be able
to cooperate in the subgame following period 0. Moreover, the discounted sum of payoffs
from repeated cooperation will more than compensate an arbitrarily patient Player 1 for his
investment.
However, while significant investment may be easy with arbitrarily patient players, it is
trickier with moderately patient players who value short term gains. Proposition 1 describes
the conditions for an investment of k 6= kd by Player 1 to form part of an equilibrium. These
conditions are that i) the players manage to play cooperatively – hence, they prefer playing
C in every period to deviating for one period and subsequently obtaining the non-cooperative
payoff forever (which is captured by condition (2) below) and ii) Player 1 prefers investing
k to playing the degenerate equilibrium (condition 3).
Proposition 1 A choice of k by Player 1 forms part of a symmetric subgame perfect equi-
librium if and only if either, a)
k = kd (1)
or b) there exists a pi such that:
pi ≤ δ
1− δR
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
(2)
and
−k + δ
1− δα1
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
≥ −kd + δ
1− δλ1
∫ ∞
0
pidF (pi, kd) (3)
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Consider a path where Player 1 has limited the maximum payoff realization to pi by
choosing p¯i = pi in period 0. Condition (2) guarantees that the players cooperate for all
payoff realizations smaller or equal to pi (if there are no incentives to deviate for a realization
pi, then it is also the case for a realization pi ≤ pi). The term ∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi)) is
the expected per period payoff when, for any realization of pi above pi, the payoff is limited
to pi.
To understand the reason that Player 1 may choose to impose an upper bound p¯i, let
pimax = {suppi s.t. (2) holds}. Since the right hand side of (2) is bounded (by δ1−δR∗E (pi|k)),
we have pimax <∞. The quantity pimax provides an upper bound on the realization of pi for
which players can cooperate when player 1 invests k. Thus, it is in Player 1’s interest to
limit the returns to the investment to be at most pimax and to choose p¯i = pimax in period 0.
If not, for realizations pi > pimax, players would be unable to cooperate, low returns would
be obtained, and the overall expected return would be lowered.
At a more intuitive level, the higher the draw of pi, the larger the temptation to deviate
and play D, since the immediate gains from deviating are increasing in pi while the future
expected draws and potential gains to cooperating are unaffected (draws are i.i.d). Suppose
that pi takes only two values piL and piH and that when pi takes the value piH , players are
unable to cooperate, while it is possible for a value piL. It would then be in the interest of the
players, when the draw of pi is piH , to restrict the value of pi to be piL, to allow for cooperation.
For instance, under the innovation interpretation from Section 2.3, the players engage in a
pricing game following a successful innovation. If the firms are not able to share monopoly
profits when the draw is very high, they might still find a lower price where cooperation is
possible.10
The existence of the upperbound pimax on the cooperative period payoff suggests that
the total surplus may be lower in the world without legal enforcement. This fact, combined
with the fact that Player 1 must share the returns from investment, and the need to sat-
isfy equilibrium constraints, implies that there may be some investment levels that, while
profitable with legal protection, do not form part of an equilibrium without such protection.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, we show that this may lead to higher equilibrium investments
in the absence of legal protections, to relax the investment constraint 2.
The conditions in Proposition 1 highlight the key role of the distribution F . We explore
in section 3.2 the role of the volatility of returns. We then explore in section section 3.3 how
10The equilibria found by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) have a similar feature, and our framework,
interpreted as in application 1, is similar to the one they use in their study of collusion in the face of
uncertain demand. We add the essential element of initial investment and use a simpler and more general
setup. Note also that we use a shock on monopoly profits rather than a shock on demand used in their
framework. This difference is crucial for the comparative statics we perform in Section 3.2.
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legal rules affects the level of investment.
3.2 Volatility and investments
Different types of investments are more or less conducive to cooperation and thus more or less
likely to be observed absent legal protection. The following proposition shows that a ceteris
paribus increase in riskiness, in the sense of a mean-preserving spread, makes investment
more difficult in the absence of legal protections (even with risk-neutral players).11
Proposition 2 Let the distribution G be a mean-preserving spread of F . Suppose that with
returns characterized by the distribution G, there is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
in which Player 1 invests k. Then with returns characterized by the distribution F , there
is also a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which Player 1 invests k. Conversely,
suppose that with returns characterized by F there is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
in which player 1 invests k 6= kd. There may not be a subgame perfect equilibrium in which
Player 1 invests k when returns are characterized by the distribution G.
Proposition 2 provides a testable prediction of the model, which we explore in our ex-
periment. We compare two treatments, one with a more volatile payoff structure than the
other. In the less volatile all investment options we propose are part of an equilibrium, while
in the other, an intermediate level is no longer part of an equilibrium (for the reasons outline
above). We examine whether participants avoid choosing that investment level and if they
don’t, what do they revert to (no investment or higher investment levels).
To gain more intuition, consider a case where we start from a distribution of returns for
which a particular investment is sustainable and take a series of mean-preserving spreads, we
might arrive at a situation where such an investment is no longer possible. As an illustration,
suppose that there are two players who discount at a rate δ = 1
2
and that in each period
following Player 1’s initial investment they play the following prisoner’s dilemma.12
C D
C (3
5
pˆit,
2
5
pˆit) (0pˆit,
3
5
pˆit)
D (4
5
pˆit, 0pˆit) (
1
10
pˆit,
1
10
pˆit)
11Similar reasoning shows that mean-preserving spreads makes collusion more difficult in the framework
of Rotemberg and Saloner, although the way they model uncertainty does not allow them to reach this
conclusion.
12Following the application in Section 2.3, we can interpret the game as one in which Player 1 is an
innovative firm and Player 2 has the ability to copy the innovation costlessly. In order to compensate Player
1 for investing, when the players cooperate, Firm 2 restricts its output to give Firm 1 a larger share. To
match this interpretation, the game is chosen to be asymmetric. This asymmetry plays no role, however.
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We contrast two distribution functions. Under F , an investment of k = 15 yields a return
of pit = 100 in each period. Under G, an investment of 15 yields a period return of 300
with probability 1
3
and 0 with probability 2
3
. In both cases, smaller investments yield 0 in
every period and larger investments are of no benefit. With legal protections, these two
technologies, which have the same mean, are equivalent for a risk-neutral agent, who will
invest 15. Without protection, however, they are quite different.
First consider F . An investment of 15 followed by (C,C) in every period forms part of a
stationary equilibrium. In any subgame, following the path yields Player 1 a total discounted
payoff of 1
1−δ60 = 120, while deviating yields 80 +
δ
1−δ10 = 90. Player 2 also has no incentive
to deviate. Moreover, Player 1’s payoff from investing is −15 + δ
1−δ60 = 45 > 0.
Now consider the distribution G. Suppose the players try to play (C,C) repeatedly and
consider a period in which a payoff of 300 has been realized. For Player 1, following the path
yields 3
5
(300)+ δ
1−δ
3
5
Epi = 240, while deviating yields 4
5
(300)+ δ
1−δ
1
10
Epi = 250. Cooperation
is no longer sustainable. The reason is that while the expected continuation payoff from
cooperating under G is the same as under F , the instantaneous gain from deviating rises
when a realization of 300 rather than 100 occurs.13 As a result, a positive investment is not
possible under G.
This no-investment conclusion does not depend upon the fact that we have restricted
ourselves to symmetric equilibria. If we drop this restriction, then new equilibria appear
under F . For instance, an investment of 15 followed by (D,C) in period 1 and (C,C) in all
subsequent periods forms part of an equilibrium. However, no new equilibria appear under
G. That is, Player 1 does not invest even if we allow for asymmetric play. More generally,
allowing for asymmetric equilibria would not affect the result of Proposition 2.14
This result has implications for the types of investments that should be observed in
developing countries (application 1, described in section 2). In countries with weak property
rights, investors worry about the risk of expropriation. Investments lead to random returns
year to year and, as shown by Duncan (2006) in an empirical study of the mining industry,
expropriations are much more likely in periods of price booms. Thus, an investor would be
more likely to initially choose an investment leading to less volatile returns. In line with
this idea, Dorsey et al. (2008) and Mikesell (1971) suggest that the share of FDI in minerals
relative to petroleum is higher in countries with strong property rights (oil prices being
less volatile than most minerals). This is of course only suggestive evidence and a more
13Here, limiting the maximum payoff by choosing p¯i < 300 does not help since this also proportionally
reduces the continuation payoff.
14In any period with a realization pit, the shape of the equilibrium affects the share of pit each player
obtains, but does not change the fact that it is a multiple of pit. Thus, the proof of Proposition 2 would
carry through.
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systematic empirical test of Proposition 2 would be in order. This is precisely the purpose
of our experiment, which tests this result by comparing two types of treatments where the
distribution of returns can be ranked according to second order stochastic dominance.
3.3 Comparing the level of investment across legal regimes
We now compare the level of investment in environments where legal protection is available
to the level in environments where it is not. However, this is often an ambiguous comparison,
with some non-degenerate equilibria in the no-protection game involving more investment
and some less. Rather than making a selection among equilibria, we examine a special
case where unambiguous statements can be made. We find conditions under which all
non-degenerate equilibria without legal protections involve more investment than with legal
protections and conditions under which they all involve less. This special case yields testable
predictions that we explore in our experiment.
When an investment which is feasible with legal protections is not sustainable without,
there are two possible reasons. One is that, in order for Player 1 to recoup the investment,
the players must cooperate but they do not manage to do so. The other is that, although the
players could manage to cooperate, Player 1 does not earn enough to justify his investment.
As we will see, in the first instance Player 1 responds by choosing a larger investment in
order to facilitate cooperation, while in the second instance Player 1 responds by choosing a
smaller investment so that less money needs to be recouped.
We now suppose that the stochastic investment process is such that, in any period, there
is either a “failure” worth 0 or a “success” worth p˜im. That is, the payoff variable pi can only
take one of two values, 0 or p˜im. The initial investment k determines the likelihood p(k) of
obtaining p˜im in any single period.
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We parameterize the likelihood function p in two ways. First, we decompose Player 1’s
investment into a fixed component H (which could be zero) that he must pay in order to
have any productive capacity at all and a variable component. If player 1 pays the fixed cost
H and an incremental amount k, then the probability of the realization p˜im in any period is
p (k) = mh (k), where h : R+ → [0, 1), h (0) = 0, h′ > 0, h′′ < 0, and m ∈ (0, 1]. If H > 0
and Player 1 does not incur the fixed cost H, then p (k) = 0 for all k. Higher H’s increase
the minimum required investment, but have no effect on the marginal impact of additional
investments above this requirement.
15Consider, for instance, the application of the model to innovation. For certain types of products, the
nature of a successful innovation is not very variable and the investment level mainly influences the frequency
of innovations. Examples include the case of upgrades of software or smartphones, where the issue is mostly
one of frequency rather than quality. It may also be the case of the fashion industry (Raustiala and Sprigman,
2006), where a crucial factor is the speed of introduction of new collections.
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Second, we use the variable m to parameterize the riskiness of the technology by writing
a successful payoff as p˜im =
pi0
m
(m also parameterizes the probability p (k) = mh (k)). Thus,
if Player 1 incurs the fixed cost H and makes an additional investment k, then, in any
single period, with probability p (k) the payoff variable pi = p˜im =
pi0
m
and with probability
(1− p (k)) the payoff variable pi = 0. Decreases in m induce a mean-preserving spread on the
innovation process and have no effect on the expected per period revenue p(k)p˜im = h(k)pi0.
With legal protections, the optimal incremental level of investment above H is inde-
pendent of H, whenever this optimal level is greater than zero, and is independent of m.
Formally, let k∗ = arg max
{−k −H + δ
1−δp (k) p˜im
}
= arg max
{−k + δ
1−δh (k) pi0
}
and de-
fine H ′ = −k∗ + δ
1−δh (k
∗)pi0. Then, with legal protections k∗ is the optimal investment for
all (m,H) ∈ (0, 1]× [0, H ′). For (m,H) ∈ (0, 1]× (H ′,∞), the optimal investment is 0.
As noted, decreases in m induce a mean-preserving spread on the returns and have no
effect on the equilibrium investment k∗ in the game with protection. However, in the no-
protection game the incremental investment k∗ gets harder to sustain as m falls (Proposition
2). An investment of k∗ that is sustainable for m = 1 may not be sustainable for smaller
values of m. The following proposition shows that, for some parameters, all non-degenerate
equilibria involve a greater investment than k∗.
Proposition 3 and 4 focus on situations where the reason for equilibrium breakdown is
the failure to cooperate. It is useful to introduce the terminology strict equilibrium: an
equilibrium in which all players strictly prefer following the path to deviating.
Proposition 3 Fix H and suppose that for m = 1 there is a strict symmetric subgame
perfect equilibrium in which Player 1 makes the incremental investment k∗ 6= kd. There
exists values m and m (m < m < 1) such that:
• If m ∈ [m, 1], there exist subgame perfect equilibria where Player 1 invests more than,
less than, or the same as k∗.
• If m ∈ [m,m], any non-degenerate equilibrium involves higher investments than with
protection: k > k∗.
• If m ∈ [0,m] the only equilibrium is the degenerate equilibrium.
Moreover there are non-empty intervals on which such equilibria exist.
While future expected profits are unaffected by decreases in m, the instantaneous tempta-
tion to play non-cooperatively in a successful period increases, since the gain from a deviation
is (βi − αi) pi0m . To counter this temptation, Player 1 increases his initial investment to in-
crease future gains from cooperation. It is crucial that this increased investment raises the
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probability of obtaining a high payoff, not (just) the value of this high payoff. As a re-
sult, the expected future returns to cooperation increase without affecting the instantaneous
gains from deviating. Suppose that, on the contrary, investment raised the successful payoff
without affecting its likelihood. That is, suppose we had p¯i = pi(k)
m
, with pi′ (k) > 0, and
p = mh for some mh ≤ 1. Then, increased investment would raise both the future returns
to cooperation and the instantaneous gains from deviating in offsetting fashion, and would
not facilitate cooperation (or make it more difficult).
A different way of comparing investment levels across regimes is to use the cooperation
ratio R. When R ≈ 0, cooperation is impossible because the gains to cooperation are small
relative to the one-period gain from deviating. Conversely, when R ≈ ∞, cooperation is
simple. More generally, as R decreases cooperation becomes more difficult.16 The following
Proposition shows that, again, this may force Player 1 to invest more than k∗.
Proposition 4 Fix H and m and suppose there is a strict symmetric subgame perfect equi-
librium in which Player 1 makes the incremental investment k∗ 6= kd. There exists values R
and R such that in the no-protection regime:
• If R ∈ [R,+∞], there may exist subgame perfect equilibria where Player 1 invests more
than, less than, or the same as k∗.
• If R ∈ [R,R], any non-degenerate equilibrium involves higher investments than with
protection: k > k∗.
• If R ∈ [0, R] the only equilibrium is the degenerate equilibrium.
Moreover there are non-empty intervals on which such equilibria exist.
Propositions 3 and 4 present reactions to cooperation failures. As cooperation becomes
more difficult to sustain, Player 1 responds by investing more, rendering cooperation easier.
The following proposition involves a comparative static where cooperation is always possible
but the issue is the investment condition. Now Player 1 responds by investing less so that
he needs to recoup less money.
Proposition 5 Let H = 0 and m = 1 and suppose there is a strict symmetric subgame per-
fect equilibrium in which Player 1 makes the incremental investment k∗ 6= kd. There exists
an Hˆ such that i) for all 0 ≤ H ≤ Hˆ, an incremental investment k∗ remains part of an
equilibrium and ii) for H > Hˆ every non-degenerate equilibrium involves an incremental in-
vestment k < k∗. Moreover there is a non-empty interval on which non-degenerate equilibria
exist.
16Note that varying R amounts to varying the shares αi, βi, γi, λi.
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4 Experimental Analysis
In this section, we present the design and results of a laboratory experiment tailored to
achieve two goals. First, to test specifically some of the results of the theoretical analysis, in
particular the effect of increased riskiness described in Proposition 2 and the possibility of
higher levels of investment described in Proposition 3. Second, since a degenerate equilib-
rium always exists, to shed light on equilibrium selection issues and provide some empirical
evidence on investment levels with and without legal protection.
4.1 Experimental setup
The experimental study is based on a series of infinitely repeated games. Participants play a
series of supergames (matches), where each supergame corresponds to an infinitely repeated
game. We implement four different experimental treatments. Two treatments correspond to
an environment with legal protection of the stochastic outcome of investments (we refer to
those as legal protection, LP, treatments) and two to an environment with no legal protection
(we refer to those as no legal protection, NP, treatments). Within each regime (LP vs NP),
we implement two different scenarios, corresponding to two different investment options. In
a given treatment, there is a unique value of the return on investment (henceforth prize)
and the investment affects the probability of obtaining this prize. In one option, there are
relatively high probabilities of obtaining a low prize; in the other option, the prize is doubled
and the probabilities are halved. We refer to the four treatments as LP-low-prize, LP-high-
prize, NP-low-prize and NP-high-prize. The comparison between NP-low-prize and NP-high
prize is the main focus of our analysis: it allows us to test the result of Proposition 2.
We reproduce infinitely repeated games in the lab using a standard procedure involving
a random continuation rule (see Dal Bo and Frechette 2011, Dal Bo 2005 and Casari and
Camera 2009 for recent examples). Within each match, at the end of each round, the
computer randomly determines whether or not another round will be played. The probability
of continuation for each game is fixed at 0.85 for all treatments and is independent of any
choices players make during the game. The players thus play a series of supergames of
random length.
In the two LP treatments, all games are single-player games (there is no interaction with
other players). In the first round of each game, the player first obtains an initial endowment of
11 tokens17 and makes an investment decision, choosing one among four possible investment
levels: 0, 1, 6 or 11 tokens. This initial investment determines the probability of obtaining
a prize in each round of the game but has no influence on the other games. The exact
171 token is converted to 5 cents for the final payment.
17
probabilities and the level of the prize depend on the treatment as described in Table 1. It
is worth remarking that length of the match (supergame) is random, and is independent of
the investment decision, even if Player 1 invested zero.
In the NP treatments, each game involves two players: an investor (player 1) and a second
player (player 2). At the beginning of the game, each player receives 11 tokens and one of
them is randomly selected to be the investor (to avoid framing issues, in the experimental
instructions we call the investor Role A and the second player Role B).18 In the first round,
player 1 makes an investment decision with the same options as in the LP treatments (player
2 takes no action in the first round). In the subsequent rounds, whenever the investment is
successful and a prize is obtained (the probability of success is determined by the decision of
the investor in the first round), the two players play a prisoner’s dilemma game represented
in Table 2 below.19
H L
H 1
2
pi, 1
2
pi 0, pi
L pi, 0 0, 0
Table 2
This set-up fits with our general framework, with αi = 1/2, βi = 1, γi = 0 and λi = 0. At
the end of each round in which a prize is obtained, each player observes the other player’s
choice (H or L).
When a match (randomly) ends, a new one starts and is played in the same way. In the
NP treatments, players are randomly re-matched with a different player. The rematching
procedures works as follows: as soon as a pair finishes a match, each of its members is
rematched with one player, randomly chosen from the first available pair (i.e., either a pair
is already waiting or they have to wait for another pair to finish). This procedure guarantees
that a subject doesnt immediately play with the same partner and limits the likelihood
of being matched with the same partner several times. In any case, the game is played
anonymously and players cannot identify their partner. For the NP treatments (resp. LP),
fifteen minutes (resp. ten minutes) after the start of the session, no new game starts but
players finish the games they started.20
18The roles are fixed throughout each match (supergame). When a match ends, rematching occurs and
the types are redrawn for this new pair of players.
19In the LP treatments, whenever the investment is successful, the prize is obtained entirely by the single
player. Nevertheless, to keep the two set of treatments symmetric, players in the LP treatment also have to
choose whether they want to play high (H) or low (L) as in the NP treatment. The choice L gives them
a profit of zero, and the choice they have to make is thus obvious, but it preserves symmetry with the NP
treatments.
20We did not put a time constraint on the games already started but they never lasted more than a few
minutes.
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4.2 Theoretical predictions
While our theoretical analysis focusses on symmetrical equilibria, nothing forces our exper-
imental subjects to do the same. Indeed, the game we have chosen may even invite them
to play asymmetrically as, say, alternating plays of (H,L) and (L,H) is myopically self-
enforcing, as opposed to repeated plays of (H,H). On the other hand, playing (H,H) is a
simpler way to cooperate. It is interesting to see the extent to which the predictions of the
model, restricted to symmetrical equilibria are borne out by the experiment.21
Our model allows us to make clear theoretical predictions. However, in practice, there
will be noisy deviations from equilibrium behavior. We do not model explicitly the process
creating this noise but assume that the distribution is the same in all treatments. This
assumption allows us to derive a number of empirical predictions from the theory.
First, in both LP treatments, the optimal choice of a risk-neutral player is an investment
level of 1, although the level of expected profits does not vary vastly across the different
positive choices (12.6 for an investment of 1, 12.1 for 6 and 11.6 for 11).22
In the case of the NP-low-prize treatment, an investment of 1 in the first round remains
part of an equilibrium whereas in the NP-high-prize treatment it does not. Examining the
incentives of the players (shown in Table 3), brings out clearly the mechanism developed
in the theory. In both NP treatments, for an investment of 1, in the subgame following
a successful realization of the investment, each player’s continuation payoff is 6.8 if both
of them play H for the rest of the game. However, in the low-prize treatment a player’s
instantaneous gain from deviating to L is only 4, while in the high-prize treatment it is 8,
and cooperation is possible only with a low prize.
In the low-prize game, all investment levels form part of an equilibrium; in the high-prize
game, all investment levels other than 1 form part of an equilibrium. We have the following
clear prediction that can be tested:
• An investment of 1 is less likely in the NP-high-prize treatment than in the NP-low-
prize treatment (special case of Proposition 2)
We can also test the consistency of the behavior in the stage prisoner dilemma game with
the mechanism we propose:23
21Recall also that one of the central predictions we test, i.e the result on mean preserving spreads is
preserved under asymmetric equilibria.
22While an investment of 1 is optimal for a risk-neutral money maximizer, subjects may have other
motivations as well. For instance, they might get benefits from varying their choices to break the tediousness
of the task.
23These are not strictly speaking predictions, but are natural consequences of the model. For instance, in
the NP-high-prize treatment, playing 1 is not an equilibrium, so interpreting what happens off the equilibrium
path is not unambiguous. However, we know that in the subgame following a prize, player B should play L
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• Following an investment of 1 by the investor, a play of L by player 2 is more likely in
the NP-high-prize treatment than in the NP-low-prize treatment
• The probability of observing H,H increases with the initial investment of the investor
Finally, we can shed light on equilibrium selection issues and show evidence on the
following questions:
• Is the zero investment degenerate equilibrium more common in the absence of protec-
tion (NP treatments)?
• Is there on average more or less investment with or without legal protections? Absent
protection, is there more investment with a high prize or a low prize?
4.3 Experimental results
The 10 experimental sessions (3 of each NP treatments and 2 of each LP treatment) were run
at the Ecole Polytechnique (France) in a dedicated experimental lab. A specific software was
designed to run the experiment to be able to rematch players while others were finishing their
game.24 The participants were a mix of students and staff at the university. A total of 132
subjects participated in the experiment playing a total of 1756 games. The average earnings
of players was 17.8 euros. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to fill in
a survey that allowed us to control for gender and whether the participants were students.
In the survey, we also introduced questions about individuals’ risk attitudes (Dohmen et
al 2011). Thus, in some of our analysis we can also control for subjects self-reported risk
attitudes.25 In all the regression analysis that follow, the standard errors are clustered at the
session level (as in Dal Bo and Frechette 2011 for instance), to control for possible session
effects that would introduce correlation in errors.26
24The software was designed under a standard server/client architecture, the server uses’ socket protocol
to communicate with the clients. The server was implemented using the Adobe Flex technology and the
clients deployed under Adobe Air. The backend of the server rely on relational database server (MySQL)
for storing. Each “game” was considered as a thread, this method allowed us to resolve the main issue for
rematching clients dynamically and keeping alive simultaneously other instances in progress.
25Some participants did not fill in the survey which explains that regressions controlling for individual
characteristics will be run on fewer observations.
26We do not cluster at the individual level since the assumption in these type of environments is that
each game can be considered as an individual observation. Note, however, that the significance of the main
results is maintained if we do cluster at the individual level.
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4.3.1 Testing the central theoretical prediction
The main theoretical prediction is that we should observe investors choosing a level of in-
vestment equal to 1 less often in the NP high-prize treatment than in the NP low-prize
treatment. The theory does not, however, predict whether we should observe a reversal to
the degenerate equilibrium or to a higher level of investment, and thus makes no prediction
on the average investment level. The experimental evidence is then useful both to test the
theoretical prediction and to shed light on equilibrium selection.
Figure 1 clearly shows that the difference between the low-prize and high-prize treatments
is striking and goes in the direction suggested by the theory. Furthermore, Figure 2 suggests
that learning strengthens this result. In the left panel we report the proportion of ones in
the first game the players played and in the right the proportion in the later games. The
proportion goes up for the low-prize treatments, while it slightly decreases in the high prize
treatments. With learning, players move closer to equilibrium behavior, although there is
always a non-negligible fraction that play non-equilibrium strategies.
We test the central prediction controlling for different factors. Table 4 reports the results
of a probit regression of the probability of an investment of one by Player 1. The probability
of observing an investment of one in the NP-low-prize treatment is significantly higher than
in the NP-high-prize treatment. This result holds even when we control for individual
characteristics and risk attitudes. A potential worry is that this result is not driven by
our mechanism but by differences in the investors’ perceptions of the two gambles. However,
when the same comparison is run between the two LP treatments, the effect tends to go in
the other direction: Figure 3 shows that in the case of legal protection of the investment,
an investment of one is more likely in the high-prize treatments.27 Thus, if any behavioral
mechanism not considered by our theoretical framework was playing a role this would tend
to go in the opposite direction with respect to our findings.
It is clear that in the high prize treatment, participants play 1 less often, but do they
revert to not investing (the degenerate equilibrium)? In Figure 4, we present the full distri-
bution of investment choices in the two NP treatments. We see that there is both an increase
in the frequency of zero investment and in the frequency of the maximum investment level.
Importantly, average investment is 13% higher in the NP-high-prize treatment and this dif-
ference is significant (p-value of 0.03 in a t-test). Consistent with our theoretical predictions,
taking a mean-preserving spread of the distribution leads to more investment on average.
27A regression analysis confirms that the effect is significant.
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4.3.2 Cooperative behavior
The results of the previous section provide strong support for the central prediction of the
theory. To further test the coherence of our explanation, in this section we examine the
cooperative behavior of the investors and the other players whenever a prize is obtained.
We first focus on the cooperative behavior in games where Player 1 chooses one token.
Figure 5 represents the distribution of outcomes in the prisoner’s dilemma keeping in each
game only the first round where a prize is obtained (the plot averaging over all rounds looks
very similar). We clearly see that the outcome LL where both players choose to defect in the
stage prisoner dilemma is much more likely in the high-prize treatment than the low-prize
treatment as the theory suggests: the temptation to deviate is much larger.
It is, of course, not easy to interpret the actions chosen in the stage prisoner dilemma
game following an investment that should not occur in equilibrium. In particular, why
would the investor make a positive investment choice if he then expects LL to be the most
likely outcome? It may therefore be more natural to focus on the behavior of the player
2’s following an investment of 1 by the investor. The results presented in Figure 6 are even
more striking: a player 2 is much more likely to choose L in the high-prize treatments than
the low prize treatments.28 The results presented in table 5 confirm the pattern observed in
Figure 6. Even when controlling for individual characteristics, there is a significantly lower
chance that a player 2 plays L following an investment of one in the low-prize treatment.
A final test of coherence with the theory is to examine the cooperative behavior by level
of investment of the investor. The more he invests, the higher the expected continuation
value in equilibrium if HH is played whenever a prize is obtained and thus the higher the
incentives to keep cooperating (Table 3 shows how much the incentives to deviate decrease
as the initial investment increases). We thus plot in Figure 7 the behavior of player 2 in the
NP-high-prize treatments, separately for investments of 1, 6 and 11. There is a clear rise in
the proportions of H’s as the investment moves from 1 to 6, although no significant change
as the investment goes from 6 to 11. Note that this fits with the results in the literature
showing that cooperation rates increase when the discount factor increases (Dal Bo 2005 or
Dal Bo and Frechette 2011).
4.3.3 Investment with legal protection vs. investment without protection
Comparing the level of investment in an environment such as the one described in our the-
oretical analysis with and without legal protection based on real world data is hard for the
28For Figure 5 and 6 and table 5, we keep in each game only the first round where a prize is obtained
provided it exists.
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simple reason that counter-factuals are hard to come by. Experiments creating artificial
counter-factuals are thus a valuable source of evidence to shed light on this comparison. We
find that the average investment is slightly higher in the absence of protection (average of
NP treatments) than in its presence (average of LP treatments), but this difference is not
significant (p-value of 0.149 in a t-test and non significant coefficient in a regression control-
ling for individual characteristics). This indicates that relatively high levels of investment
are possible even without legal protection as suggested in the theoretical section. The main
focus of the experiment is to test the mechanism we propose.
Taken together, the results of the experiment provide evidence broadly coherent with
our theoretical model. Investors are less likely to choose the investment level of one in the
high-prize treatments in the absence of legal protection and, when they do, player 2’s are
more likely to defect (choose action L) in the stage prisoner dilemma game. Furthermore, the
overall results provide evidence that investment in the absence of protection (NP treatments)
and with perfect legal protection (LP treatment ) are quite similar.
5 Conclusion
Our theory of investment and cooperation in the shadow of future interactions has multiple
possible applications. In particular, our central results can be summarized in the context of
a specific example, that of the firm Red Hat. Red Hat, a hugely successful company, was
created in 1993. At its stock market introduction, Red Hat was one of the biggest IPOs in
the NASDAQ and, since 2009, has been part of the S&P500, with over 3000 employees and
revenues of over 500 million dollars. For many, this success is puzzling, since the company’s
business model is based on open source software. Most of Red Hat’s revenues come from
the sale to companies of subscriptions, including their own pre-compiled version of the open
source operating system Linux, called Red Hat Enterprise Linux, and support services.29
Two facts are particularly striking. First, as acknowledged in Red Hat’s annual report:
“anyone can copy, modify and redistribute Red Hat Enterprise Linux (...) however they are
not permitted to refer to these products as Red Hat”. Numerous clones do indeed exist, but
they appear to avoid competing aggressively and do not gain much market share. Second, in
spite of a potentially extremely competitive environment, Red Hat invests a lot in research.
According to a report from the Linux Foundation, Red Hat is the biggest single contributor
to the Linux Kernel (excluding unaffiliated contributors), and pays the salaries of many of
the top contributing individuals.
29According to Red Hat’s annual report, the revenues from subscriptions in 2010 were $541M out of a
total revenue of $652M .
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Our model can explain such behavior. On the equilibrium path, Red Hat’s clones, ratio-
nally choose not to be too aggressive.30 This can be part of an equilibrium only if Red Hat
invests sufficiently in research. In the spirit of our Proposition 2, the type of environment
in which Red Hat operates seems particularly well adapted for investment in the absence of
protection since it involves many small incremental innovations (high probability of obtain-
ing small returns). Of course this claim is tricky to establish empirically. This is the main
justification for conducting the laboratory experiment that broadly confirms our results.
Greif (1989 and 1993) finds that social norms in medieval times were able to sustain
long-distance trade in the absence of contract enforcement by courts. Our model suggests
an informal arrangement complementary to the one developed by Greif, and suggests, more-
over, that trade might have been even more intense because of the absence of legal rules.
Merchants needed to keep the promise of the future high to keep intermediaries cooper-
ative. Interestingly, the model suggests that the merchants would not send bigger ships
(which would leave the incentives to deviate unchanged) but more robust ones having higher
chances of reaching their final destination.
30The manager of a clone declared in an interview, “We have the utmost respect for Red Hat and everything
they have done for the community over the years. We have absolutely no desire to upset them” (Kerner
2005).
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Part a of the proposition is immediate. For Part b, suppose
there exists a value p˜i and an investment k such that conditions (2) and (3) hold and let
Player 1 choose pi = p˜i in Period 0 along with an investment k. Consider an equilibrium path
in which all the players play C forever with a threat of D forever (the worst punishment) if
anyone deviates (including Player 1 initially deviating to a different choice of k). Suppose
that in period t the realization of the payoff variable is pit and recall that pˆit = min {pit, p¯i}.
Starting in period t, following the path yields a player (for i = 1 or o)
αipˆit + αi
δ
1− δ
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
while deviating yields
βipˆit + λi
δ
1− δ
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
All players will follow the path if
(βi − αi) pˆit ≤ (αi − λi) δ
1− δ
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
for i = 1 and o
iff pˆit ≤ δ
1− δR
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
which holds from condition (2), since pˆit ≤ p¯i = p˜i. Player 1’s overall payoff will then be:
−k + δ
1− δα1
(∫ pi
0
pidF (pi, k) + pi (1− F (pi))
)
From condition (3), this expected payoff is larger than the payoff from choosing a different
value of k since the other players play D forever in that case. Therefore conditions (2) and
(3) guarantee that a subgame perfect equilibrium with investment k > kd exists.
Conversely, for given k, let p˜imax = {sup p˜i s.t. 2 holds} (we showed in the main text that
p˜imax exists). Then p˜imax is an upperbound on the single period payoff on which the players
can cooperate. If:
−k + δ
1− δα1
(∫ pimax
0
pidF (pi, k) + pimax (1− F (pimax))
)
< −kd + δ
1− δλ1
∫ ∞
0
pidF (pi, kd)
then Player 1 will prefer to invest kd to k.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that under G there is a symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium in which Player 1 invests k. From Proposition 1 there is a p˜i such that
p˜i ≤ δ
1− δR
(∫ p˜i
0
pidG (pi, k) + p˜i (1−G (p˜i))
)
and
−k + δ
1− δα1
(∫ pi
0
pidG (pi, k) + pi (1−G (pi))
)
≥ −kd + δ
1− δλ1
∫ ∞
0
pidG (pi, kd)
Integrating by parts, we can rewrite these conditions as:
pi ≤ R δ
1− δ
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
G(pi, k)dpi
)
and
−k + δ
1− δα1
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
G(pi, k)dpi
)
≥ −kd + δ
1− δλ1
∫ ∞
0
pidG (pi, kd)
Since G is a mean-preserving spread of F , F second order stochastically dominates G.
From the definition of second order stochastic dominance,(
pi −
∫ pi
0
G(pi, k)dpi
)
≤
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
F (pi, k)dpi
)
.
Hence,
pi ≤ R δ
1− δ
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
F (pi, k)dpi
)
and
−k + δ
1− δα1
(
pi −
∫ pi
0
F (pi, k)dpi
)
≥ −kd + δ
1− δλ1
∫ ∞
0
pidG (pi, kd)
= −kd + δ
1− δλ1
∫ ∞
0
pidF (pi, kd)
Thus, a choice of k is also sustainable under F . Conversely, we give an example in the main
text showing that some investments k 6= kd can be part of an equilibrium under F and not
under G.
Proof of Proposition 3. We can rewrite the conditions of Proposition 1 for an
investment k as:
pi0
m
≤ δ
1− δRmh(k)
pi0
m
⇔ 1
m
≤ δ
1− δRh(k) (4)
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and
−k + δ
1− δα1pi0h(k) ≥ −kd +
δ
1− δλ1pi0h(kd) (5)
Let m be defined by:
1
m
=
δ
1− δRh(k
∗)
For m > m, the cooperation constraint (4) is satisfied. Given that k∗ is part of an
equilibrium for m=1, the investment constraint (5) is also satisfied. So, as stated in the
Proposition 1, k∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium and so are some values k larger and
smaller than k∗.
For m < m, the cooperation constraint (4) evaluated at k∗ is violated, so that following
an investment of k ≤ k∗ the players play non-cooperatively and the only possible equilibrium
with k ≤ k∗ is the degenerate equilibrium, where Player 1 chooses k = kd.
There is however a range of values such that some investments strictly above k∗ are part
of an equilibrium. Define m as:
1
m
=
δ
1− δRh(k)
where k is such that:
−k + δ
1− δα1pi0h(k) = −kd +
δ
1− δλ1pi0h(kd)
Given this definition, for m ≥ m, an investment of k > k∗ is part of a subgame perfect
equilibrium. This establishes the second result of the Proposition.
Finally, for m < m, the only non-degenerate equilibria would involve investments above
k. We show below that this would lead to negative profits and cannot therefore be an
equilibrium. Thus, for this region, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is the degenerate
equilibrium.
Define:
G(k) = −k + δ
1− δα1pi0h(k)−
(
−kd + δ
1− δλ1pi0h(kd)
)
We know G(k∗) > 0, G(k) = 0, and because G
′′
< 0, this implies that G
′
< 0 for k > k.
Thus G(k) < 0 for k > k
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition
3. Given the distribution function at hand, the condition for cooperation can be rewritten
as p˜i ≤ δ
1−δRp(k
∗)p˜i. Let R be defined by 1 = δ
1−δRp(k
∗). Since k∗ forms part of a strict
equilibrium, mini
[
α¯i−λ¯i
β¯i−α¯i
]
> R¯ and −k∗ + δ
1−δ α¯1p(k
∗)p˜i > −kd + δ1−δ λ¯1p(kd)p˜i. By continuity,
there are parameters αi, βi, γi, and λi for which R > R and Player 1 invests more than k
∗
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and parameters for which he invests less. In these equilibria, the other players threaten to
play non-cooperatively if Player 1 does not make the “appropriate” investment.
If R < R, investing k∗ can no longer be part of an equilibrium since the players will play
non-cooperatively following an investment k∗. To induce the players to play cooperatively,a
higher level of investment needs to be made. Again, by continuity there are parameter values
for which R < R and a higher investment forms part of an equilibrium.
Finally, let G(k) = −k + δ
1−δp(k)p˜i. Notice that, G (0) = 0 and G (k
∗) > 0. Since G′′ < 0
and G
(
δ
1−δ p˜i
)
< 0, there exists a kˆ > k∗ such that G(kˆ) = 0 and G (k) < 0 for all k > kˆ.
Define R by 1 = δ
1−δRp(kˆ). For R < R, cooperation is possible only if k > kˆ. But Player 1
cannot recoup such an investment since, for all k > kˆ and α1, −k+α1 δ1−δp(k)p˜i < G (k) < 0.
Thus, in this region, the only subgame perfect equilibrium involves an investment k = kd.
Proof of Proposition 5. Since k∗ is a strict equilibrium forH = 0, −k∗+ δ
1−δ α¯1p (k
∗) p˜i >
−kd+ δ1−δ λ¯1p(kd)p˜i. Let Hˆ be defined by Hˆ = −k∗+ δ1−δλ1p (k∗) pi. For 0 ≤ H ≤ Hˆ, an invest-
ment of the fixed cost H plus the variable cost k∗ remains part of an equilibrium. For H > Hˆ,
a variable investment of k∗ is not part of an equilibrium, since −k∗−H + δ
1−δλ1p (k
∗) pi < 0.
Moreover, neither is any variable investment k > k∗ since d
dk
(−k∗ −H + δ
1−δλ1p (k
∗) pi
)
=
−1 + δ
1−δλ1p
′ (k∗) pi < −1 + δ
1−δp
′ (k∗) pi = 0 and d
2
dk2
(−k −H + δ
1−δλ1p (k)pi
)
< 0. Since k∗
is a strict equilibrium, 1 < δ
1−δRmh(k
′). Let k′ < k∗ be defined by 1 = δ
1−δRmh(k
′) and H ′
be defined by −k′−H ′ + δ
1−δλ1p (k
′) pi = 0. For all H ∈
(
Hˆ,H ′
)
, an investment of k′ forms
part of an equilibrium.
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Table 1: Investment options in high vs low prize treatments
Low-prize treatments High-prize treatments
Investment Prize Probability Prize Probability
0 8 0 16 0
1 8 0.3 16 0.15
6 8 0.4 16 0.2
11 8 0.5 16 0.25
Table 2: Stage prisoner’s dilemma experimental game
H L
H Π/2,Π/2 0,Π
L Π, 0 0, 0
Note: Π = 8 for the low-prize treatments and Π = 16 for the high-prize treatments
Table 3: Profits and deviation incentives in NP treatments
Low-prize treatments High-prize treatments
Investment Expected Deviation Expected Deviation
profits of incentive profits of incentives
player 1 player 1
1 10.8 -2.8 14.8 1.2
6 13.1 -5.1 17.1 -1.1
11 15.3 -7.3 19.3 -3.3
NOTE: Expected profits of player 1 calculated under the assumption that (H,H) is played whenever
a prize is obtained. Deviation incentives is the difference between the prize (i.e deviation profits) and the
expected profits if (H,H) is played whenever a prize is obtained (i.e expected profits on equilibrium path). A
positive value for the deviation incentives means that level of investment cannot be part of an equilibrium.
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Table 4: Probability of observing investment of 1 by player 1 in NP treatments
(1) (2) (3)
Low prize treatment .37∗∗ .29∗∗ .37∗
(.15) (.13) (.21)
Individual controls (except risk) no yes yes
All controls no no yes
Number of observations 947 893 893
NOTE: This table reports the coefficients of a probit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy
taking the value 1 if an investment of 1 was made. The main explanatory variable is a dummy taking
value 1 for low prize treatments. Column (1) does not control for individual characteristics, column (2)
controls for socio economic characteristics and column (3) adds risk aversion. We restrict the sample to NP
treatments. Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses . ***Significant at the 1 percent
level, **Significant at the 5 percent level , *Significant at the 10 percent level
Table 5: Probability of player 2 playing L in games where player 1 invested 1
(1) (2) (3)
Low prize treatment -.44 -.36 -.71∗∗
(.38) (.31) (.36)
Individual controls (except risk) no yes yes
All controls no no yes
Clustered standard errors no no no
Number of observations 183 171 167
NOTE: This table reports the coefficients of a probit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy
taking the value 1 if player 2 played L. The main explanatory variable is a dummy taking value 1 for low prize
treatments. Column (1) does not control for individual characteristics, column (2) controls for socio economic
characteristics and column (3) adds risk aversion. We restrict the sample to observations corresponding to
the first time a prize is obtained in the game (provided it exists). Standard errors clustered at the session
level in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level , *Significant
at the 10 percent level
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